Quotidiano indipendente di economia e politica dei trasporti
11:03 GMT+2
Rapporto dell'Intercargo sugli incidenti alle portarinfuse. Nel 2000 sono affondate 14 navi
L'età media delle unità era di 20,4 anni, a riprova che le rinfusiere più vecchie sono statisticamente più a rischio
2 maggio 2001
L'International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), ha reso noto oggi il suo rapporto sulle perdite delle navi portarinfuse nel 2000 e nel decennio 1991-2000, di cui riportiamo un'ampia sintesi.
Lo scorso anno sono affondate quattordici navi su un totale di 5.513 rinfusiere e 23 persone hanno perso la vita in questi incidenti. Diciotto persone sono morte nel solo affondamento della Leader L. Si tratta del minor numero di incidenti registrato nell'ultimo decennio.
L'età media delle navi affondate nel era di 20,4 anni e nel decennio di 20,3 anni: questo dimostra - ha chiarito Intercargo - che le portarinfuse più vecchie sono statisticamente più a rischio.
I cedimenti strutturali rimangono la causa principale degli incidenti.
«Minimizzare la perdita di vite umane in mare e l'inquinamento causato dalle rinfusiere è la nostra priorità - ha detto il presidente di Intercargo, Frederick Chavalit Tsao - questo rapporto sugli incidenti contribuisce a farci capire perché le navi portarinfuse sono state perdute. Con questa consapevolezza l'industria potrà provvedere a ridurre ulteriormente le perdite di rinfusiere».
INTERCARGO
Bulk Carrier Casualty Report
2000 and the previous ten years (1991-2000)
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRY CARGO SHIPOWNERS
4 London Wall Buildings, 2/F Blomfield St. London EC2M 5NT
While this report has been developed using the best information currently available, it is intended purely as guidance and is to be used at the user's own risk. No responsibility is accepted by INTERCARGO or by any person, firm, corporation or organisation who or which has been in any way concerned with the furnishing of information or data, the compilation, publication or authorised translation, supply or the sale of this report, for the accuracy of any information or advice given herein or for any omission here from or for any consequences whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with or adoption of guidance contained herein.
Analysis of Total Losses over the previous ten years (1991-2000)
Summary
Figure 2 Losses (en bloc) by cause, type, age and cargo
Figure 3 Losses (by year) by cause, dwt, average age and lives lost
Figure 4 Flag State performance
Figure 5 Comparison losses for all cargo ships
Casualty List for 2000
Geographical overview of the total losses
Total losses
Serious casualties
Executive Summary
Fourteen ships and twenty-three lives were lost during the year 2000, although these figures do not take into account losses from bulk carriers of less than 10,000 dwt of which at least ten were reported as lost. The previous ten-year totals now amount to one hundred and thirty-four ships and seven hundred and forty lives lost. At just over twenty years, the average age of the bulk carriers lost during 2000 again was significantly higher than the average age of the world fleet.
Notable losses in 2000 included the Leader L, which sank as a result of structural failure with the loss of eighteen lives, and which precipitated the expulsion of the classification society PRS from IACS. The Treasure, another sinking as a result of structural failure, went down off the South African coast after being denied a port of refuge. It caused heavy pollution from the bunker fuel it had on board. Bad weather drove three ships ashore. In September the Bintang Biru sank in typhoon conditions off Korea, and right at the end of the year the John-R ran aground on the Norwegian coast and the Coral Bulker dragged her anchor while waiting for port clearance and became fast on a breakwater. One company, Ilias Shipping, had the misfortune to lose two ships, the Eurobulker IV & X and both in Mediterranean waters.
Analysis of the losses that occurred over the ten-year period show a general level of consistency in the average age and annual total deadweight (dwt) of the ships lost. This is despite the introduction of the ESP in 1996 (earlier by class) and the amendments to SOLAS chapter VI and the introduction of the BLU Code in 1998. Bulk carriers continue to suffer a similar number of losses to tankers. Structural failure remains both a consistent and significant cause of loss, while the presence of heavy cargoes feature in many of those losses.
INTERCARGO continues to be concerned with the continuing losses of bulk carriers and their crews and calls for more effort in the task of casualty investigations, particular when structural failure seems to be the likely cause.
April 2001
Commentary on the Year 2000
Scope
INTERCARGO has been producing an annual Bulk Carrier Casualty Report for many years. The Report is written to raise general awareness that every year bulk carriers are lost, often under normal operating conditions.
The Report covers all types of dry bulk carriers over 10,000 dwt, including combination and ore carriers. This year it is not restricted to marine casualties that only involved the total loss of a ship. Serious casualties or 'near misses' that involved actual or suspected hull structural damage, loss of life, heavy contact damage or severe pollution have also been listed for information and lessons learned, although have not been included in the analysis. Routine incidents of grounding, engine failure or collision have not been listed on the basis that such incidents can equally occur to all ship types. Four of the serious casualties listed, the Ais Mamas, Brave Master, Countess and Pep Nautic, went straight to scrap because of their condition. Arguably, they all could be considered as 'very near misses'.
The analysis undertaken both contrasts total loss casualty rates in 2000 with that of the previous ten year period (1991-2000), and looks back year by year to identify casualty trends.
Sources
The year 2000 data set, based upon casualty records published in the shipping press, has been checked and verified by the following classification societies: American Bureau of Shipping (ABS); Bureau Veritas (BV); China Classification Society (CCS); Det Norske Veritas (DNV); Germanischer Lloyd (GL); Korean Register of Shipping (KR); Lloyd's Register of Shipping (LR); Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK); Polski Regestr Statkow (PRS); Registro Italiano Navale (RINA); and the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS).
Information on bulk carrier fleet sizes has been obtained from Clarkson Research Studies and 'all ship type' comparison data from the International Underwriting Association (IUA). The photograph of the Bintang Biru on the front cover is being used with the permission of Table Bay Underway Shipping.
A number of significant casualty investigation reports were also published during 2000 and these include: the Derbyshire (sank 9 Sept 1980), Flare (sank 16 Jan 1998), Leader L (sank 23 Mar 2000), and the Leros Strength (sank 8 Feb 1997). Reference is made to these in this Report.
Casualty investigation and reporting
While marine casualties may be routinely reported, they also need to be investigated so that the causes and contributing factors can be established and lessons can be learned through the implementation of remedial measures and better training.
Provisions in the SOLAS, MARPOL and Load Lines conventions place a duty on flag States to conduct investigations when one of its ships suffers a serious casualty and when it judges an investigation to be necessary. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also places obligations on flag (and coastal) States. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted in 1997 a Code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents and two Circulars with a view to promoting harmonised investigation and reporting procedures and to encourage early reporting. The flag State performance self-assessment form also invites flag States to judge themselves in their ability to undertake thorough and prompt casualty investigations.
IMO maintains a database on casualties based upon the investigation reports it receives from flag States. Lists of serious casualties are circulated each year. An IMO correspondence group on casualty analysis reviews the reports and provides a summary of analysis, lessons learned and recommendations for further action by IMO. IMO is currently reviewing how best lessons learned can be disseminated directly to seafarers. One of the recommendations from the Derbyshire report was that a specific marine accident database covering storm damage should be established.
While often willing to assist flag States, classification societies do not have the same duty (and powers) to undertake casualty investigations as flag States do. It is however generally recognised that the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) and its members have a role in undertaking casualty investigations and sharing any knowledge gained. To this extent, the prompt action of PRS in publishing its Report in July on the investigation into the loss of the Leader L and the lives of 18 crewmembers must be welcomed.
At the IACS Council meeting with Industry Associations in December 2000, it was decided to establish a Joint IACS/Industry Working Group to look into issues such as accident investigation and the Early Warning System (EWS) of sharing safety critical information. INTERCARGO participates in this Group.
Finally, ships also have a duty to ensure that shipborne accidents are reported. Under the ISM Code, the Company should be informed and all accidents should be investigated and analysed to establish the cause.
It is important that bulk carrier casualties, particularly those where structural failure is thought to be the cause, are formally investigated. The lack of public information on casualties continues to be a barrier to the better understanding of why casualties occur and why ships and lives continue to be lost at sea.
Voyage data recorders
New SOLAS chapter V carriage requirements that will enter into force on 1 July 2002 will require all new internationally-trading bulk carriers over 3,000 grt to be fitted with a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR).
VDRs are designed to record information relating to the operation of the ship and store it safely for up to 2-years inside a protective capsule mounted on an external deck close to the bridge. Following an incident the capsule would be recovered from the ship and the data held used to assist the casualty investigation.
While VDR carriage requirements are now in place - there are, in fact, even now moves in the IMO and the European Union to consider extending the requirements to cover existing cargo ships - recovery obligations still remain to be considered. On the basis that the VDR has been specified to survive an incident, including one involving a severe fire or a deep-water sinking, it can only be assumed that a parallel intention also exists to require the recovery of a VDR after an incident.
INTERCARGO is concerned both about the prospect of VDR recovery liabilities (and costs) attaching to the shipowner and the introduction of new regional carriage requirements that extend those only recently agreed by the IMO.
Current work at IMO
There are four main areas of current work and at least one pending. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) has under its wing a Working Group on Bulk Carrier Safety and the Sub-Committee on Stability and Load Lines and on Fishing Vessels Safety (SLF), which is revising the Load Line convention. The Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) is involved in the development of rules for ballast water exchange. The Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC) working with the Facilitation Committee (FAL), is looking at ship/shore interface matters including the development of a loading/unloading manual for terminal representatives. The one pending item is port of refuge. The incident of the stricken tanker Castor off the Spanish coast and its inability to find a safe haven to off-load its cargo of gasoline, has now firmly added this item to the work agenda of IMO.
Structural matters
The IMO Working Group on Bulk Carrier Safety was formed in 1998 to consider three main areas of work:
those outstanding from the 1997 SOLAS Conference but not implemented by the chapter XII amendments to SOLAS
The chapter XII amendments to SOLAS, which entered into force in 1999, only apply to ships greater than 150 metres in length. The Norwegian Maritime Directorate noted in the report it published in July 2000 into the sinking in its waters of the Leros Strength, that chapter XII would not have in fact been applicable to that ship. Another matter that
currently falls outside chapter XII concerns the use of water detection sensors in spaces such as holds. One of the Derbyshire recommendations called for the indication on the bridge of bilge levels in forward spaces.
(ii) the findings from the re-opened investigation into the loss of the Derbyshire
The UK Government published its latest report on the Derbyshire in November 2000. The Derbyshire, a 4-year old combination carrier that sank off Japan in 1980 in typhoon sea conditions with total loss of life, was believed to have gone down by the head after her chain lockers, bosuns store and the forepeak had flooded. The resultant increase in green water loading on her forward hatchcovers caused them to fail. Many of the recommendations in the report therefore focused on the need to prevent water entry forward and call for, amongst other things: the investigation of minimum strength requirements for ventilators and air pipes and the introduction of electronic indicators to indicate if opened or damaged; the improved securing of stores hatch lids and sealing of spurling pipes; and the automatic opening, closing and securing of hatchcovers. On the issue of hatchcover strength the report concluded "that the minimum hatchcover strength requirements laid down for forward hatches in the Load Lines convention in conjunction with the prescribed minimum permissible freeboard … are seriously deficient in the context of present day concepts of acceptable safety levels".
(iii) the outcome of the various Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) studies
During 2000, work on the international UK co-ordinated and independent Japanese FSA studies on bulk carrier safety continued. A program of bulk carrier seakeeping model tests has also been conducted to support the studies, the work of the SLF Sub-Committee in its revision of the Load Lines convention and to look specifically into the relationship between bow height, deck wetness and hatchcover wave loading. The FSA study results are not expected before 2002. It would appear unlikely, therefore, that any new convention rule changes for enhancing the safety of bulk carrier will be agreed before 2003/2004 at the earliest.
There was a general outcry from many parts of the industry concerning the piece-meal approach to rule making that took place during the 1990's to enhance bulk carrier safety. INTERCARGO supports the current policy of undertaking a thorough and careful review first, before embarking on the next round of changes.
IACS and the classification sector for its part has continued its programme of rule making. It was agreed during 2000 to introduce new rules, with effect from 1 July 2001, to strengthen the Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP) and to tighten the Transfer of Class Agreement (TOCA). Agreement was also reached to require the mandatory use of exclusive surveyors for all statutory survey work and two surveyors when undertaking ESP surveys on ships over 15 years old. These changes are largely consistent with many of the recommendations contained in the Norwegian Leros Strength report.
It is also interesting to note that the Cyprus Maritime Administration initiated a study in 2000 affecting 40 of its flagged bulk carriers, many of which were over 20 years old, to evaluate the condition of the ships and how best a programme to continuously monitor the strength aspects of its fleet could be implemented.
Ballast water exchange
Against a background of increasing numbers of ports and regions that place unilateral ballast water exchange controls on ships, MEPC continued its work in developing the rules that would be applied internationally to all ships. It is expected that a convention will be adopted in 2002/2003. It is also expected that new ships will be faced with more stringent rules than existing ships as such ships would have the benefit of appropriately designed ballast management, control and venting systems.
It is acknowledged that ballast water exchange at sea has the potential to significantly increase the risks affecting bulk carrier operations, particularly if attempted in unfavorable weather conditions. The two main exchange methods that can be used both have their problems. The sequential method can be complex and severely impact on the ship's stability, longitudinal strength, propeller immersion and cause slamming and sloshing. The flow-through method can lead to the over-pressurisation of tanks, and in cold weather, cause icing on deck.
Inappropriate ballasting was one of the factors cited by the Canadian Government in its investigation report into the loss of the Flare, which sank in 1998 in bad weather off its coast. In response to this report LR, with whom the Flare had been classed, issued a technical alert in June 2000 emphasising the importance of handling ballast water in compliance with the approved loading manuals held on board and issued by class. While the Canadian investigations found no evidence that the Flare had been attempting to exchange ballast at the time of the loss, LR nevertheless stressed that any exchange should only be carried out in accordance with a ballast water management plan.
INTERCARGO believes that, for reasons of safety, it is important that ballast water management plans are developed in accordance with, and be a fully integrated part of the other loading guidance information and systems supplied to a ship. For bulk carriers these would include the Loading manual issued by class, and the Bulk carrier booklet and Loading instrument required by SOLAS.
Loading/unloading of bulk carriers
Damage occurring to ships during cargo operations can have a significant impact on structural strength (and safety) of the ship. The amendments to SOLAS chapter VI that entered into force in 1998 were intended to ensure that no excessive stress was placed on the ship's structure during cargo operations. They also required ships to carry a Bulk carrier booklet giving advice on cargo handling operations, and to only conduct loading/unloading operations according to an agreed Plan and the recommendations contained in the Code of practice for the safe loading and unloading of bulk carriers (BLU Code).
One recent report that was considered by the IMO correspondence group on casualty analysis concerned the Lassia. While discharging iron ore in Italy in November 1999 she suddenly sagged causing her main deck to collapse. The investigation found that the terminal, while accepting the unloading plan, did not adhere to it. The ship also failed to monitor the unloading process and although fitted with a loading instrument, failed to continuously monitor it to check the shearforce and bending moments on the ship during the discharge.
In September 2000, the Australian Government published a report on an incident involving the Padang Hawk. The ship had loaded a cargo of nickel ore that appeared to have liquefied and settled due to excessive moisture content. The ship on this occasion was not, however, lost and she managed to limp into an Australian port. The report referred to an incident in 1998 when the Sea Prospect, also carrying nickel ore, capsized and sank with the loss of ten crewmembers. The report rightly pointed out that the cause of that loss had not been established and therefore may not have been linked to the cargo.
INTERCARGO has introduced a Terminal Reporting Form to monitor reports from ships on terminal practice and procedures. A Report that analysed the replies received over a period of 5 years was published in September 2000.
Port of refuge
This became a bulk carrier issue in June 2000 when the Treasure sank off the SouthAfrican coast days after being denied a port of refuge. The Treasure had 1,300 tonnes of bunkers on board and caused extensive pollution when it sunk. Other recent cases included the laden tankers Erika at the end of 1999 and Castor at the end of 2000.
The dilemma faced by coastal States not wanting to risk disabled or damaged ships seeping oil and polluting their beaches is well understood. Refusal to allow a ship in could, however, lead to a loss of a ship and loss of lives. INTERCARGO believes that urgent consideration needs to be given to the establishment of pre-designated deep-water and sheltered ports / anchorages of refuge close to the major sea-lanes, rather than waiting for an incident to occur first before attempting to find an available safe haven.
Analysis of Total Losses in 2000
Summary
14 bulk carriers over 10,000 dwt have been identified as total losses (ATL or CTL) for the year 2000 out of a world bulk carrier fleet, at the start of the year, of 5513 ships
in addition at least 10 bulkers carriers of less than 10,000 dwt have been reported as lost: Bangluang (IMO # 7017167); Hualien No.1 (# 8402486); Manila Spirit (# 8118205); Marine Dove (# 8402450); Mercs Uhama (# 6903022); Revenge (# 7628942); Rui Xiang (# 8015099); Sky Prima (# 8305951); Trang An (# 8114845); Yong Fa (# 7900948)
23 crewmembers lost their lives, 18 of those from the Leader L which sankin the Atlantic Ocean
20.4 years was the average age of the bulk carriers lost compared to an average age for the world fleet of 14.6 years
0.6m.dwt was lost out of a total of 255.4 m.dwt for the world fleet
It needs to be noted here that, in terms of fleet size by number of ships, handysize (10-34,999 dwt) represents 43% of the world bulk carrier fleet, handymax (35-49,999 dwt) 24%, panamax (50-79,999 dwt) 21% and capesize (+80,000 dwt) 12%
The figure shows the total number of bulk carrier losses over the 10-year period, for those flag States with the largest fleets (by number) of bulk carriers. Using estimated % market share values and assuming an average annual world bulk carrier fleet of 5,250 ships, casualty ratios have been calculated to indicate the relative performance of each flag.
This figure is based on data from the International Underwriting Association (IUA) of London. It compares total losses by number of all bulkers, tankers and other cargo ships of over 500 grt.
- Via Raffaele Paolucci 17r/19r - 16129 Genova - ITALIA
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Direttore responsabile Bruno Bellio Vietata la riproduzione, anche parziale, senza l'esplicito consenso dell'editore
L'International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), ha reso noto oggi il suo rapporto sulle perdite delle navi portarinfuse nel 2000 e nel decennio 1991-2000, di cui riportiamo un'ampia sintesi. 
- Via Raffaele Paolucci 17r/19r - 16129 Genova - ITALIA
