| The year 2001 was hit with the biggest single
 event in the history of insurance, now known as the '9/11', provisionally some $ 32 to $ 50
 billion. One of the consequences has been the substantial increase in premiums in 2001 covering
 all sectors of the market. There was no way of foretelling an event of such dimensions and the
 premiums, which would have allowed insurers to meet such an eventuality, were far from being
 collected. Without specific premiums to cover claims, insurers have had to empty their
 reserves. Substantial resources have been brought into play by insurers to try to handle all
 claims being made. Very likely, insurers will fulfil their commitments and considerable
 indemnities have already been paid out.
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 | At the beginning of the year, the relative
 improvement in the market gave some hope to marine insurers. In fact, premiums were increased
 by a considerable amount of around 15 % and for some owners, increases of over 100 % for
 premiums and also an increase of deductibles. 
 Placing old fleets or small units (one or two ships) and/or presenting bad loss records to
 insurers, has become extremely difficult without increasing rates considerably and reducing the
 scope of cover tempting some players to work with insurers whose creditworthiness cannot always
 be counted on.
 
 Despite the broad scope of measures taken by insurers the year 2002 has proved to be a
 catastrophic vintage for European insurers in general including marine insurance. The two main
 reasons are as follows:
 - Firstly, a bad series of accidents: During the months of September and October 2002, some twenty
 major and particularly dramatic incidents absorbed between them nearly a third of the volume of
 annual premiums in marine insurance. The fire on the 'Diamond Princess', the attack on the
 'Limburg', the running aground of the 'Hual Europe', 'Ocean Lexington' and 'Treasure
 Bay'' came to more than $900 million in the books of marine insurers and their re-insurers.
 Very few insurers have escaped this series of disasters, particularly as the misfortunes
 continued to carry on throughout the last two months of the year 2002 with notably:
 
 November 11th 2002: fire on board the containership 'Hanjin
 Pennsylvania' ' a cost that could reach close to $100 million,November 13th and 19th 2002: leak and shipwreck of the
 tanker 'Prestige' off the Spanish coast ' a cost of some $ 42 million
 (including P&I),December 1st 2002: fire on board the sail schooner 'Wind
 Song' in Polynesia ' costing $26 million (total loss),December 14th 2002: collision in the English Channel
 between the containership 'Kariba' and the car-carrier 'Tricolor' - a cost
 which could slightly exceed $100 million. 
 Even marine insurers, who might have been spared
 from any of the above catastrophes, are however deeply affected by the increase in re-insurance
 costs. The hike in re-insurance premiums is the result of disasters affecting the marine sector
 but also other sectors such as natural disasters where the losses, according to Munich Re,
 amount to $ 55 billion in 2002 of which $11.5 billion are insured.
 Aviation insurance which has had a run of calamities (hull and liabilities) of more than
 $6 billion in 2001, has turned around quickly in 2002 with total claims estimated at $1.06
 billion.
 
 The P&I market is also affected. The P&I Club members of the International Group (IG Group)
 have not been spared by the losses over the last 3 years despite a relatively stable level of
 accident claims.
 For accounts ending February 20th 2002, it helps to distinguish
 3 groups of clubs: 
 those more or less close to a balanced position (North,
 Gard, West),the big losers (Swedish, London, UK, Britannia),the 'enhanced profit' group, namely American Club /
 Skuld and Steamship whose profits stem from the inclusion of results of the
 significant 'excess calls' they made. Globally the results of the Clubs, members of
 the IG Group are negative: The average increase in P&I premiums in 2002 was around 22
 %, excluding excess calls imposed by some Clubs. Market analysts predict losses situated
 between $ 75 and $ 125 million for the underwriting year ending February 20th 2003.
 For renewals as from February 20th 2003, the Clubs have announced general increases of 15 to 25
 % before re-insurance costs. The cost of the main programme of re-insurance of the IG Group has
 increased by about 40 %, this hike being differently apportioned according to the type of ship.
 
 - Secondly, the drop in Stock Exchange performances and its repercussions on the marine
 insurance world:
 
 The period when the financial results subsidised the technical underwriting deficits has
 definitely come to an end. The Dow Jones Stoxx Insurance index lost 51 % after having dropped
 by 30.5 % in 2001. The first 10 European insurers (excluding ING) have lost 192.2 billion euros
 in stock valuation within a year. One has to add together the top eight European stock exchange
 capitalisation, to be able to match the number one in the world, the American AIG.
 
 The drop in the stock exchange market has continued in 2002, primarily due to a lack of
 confidence among investors following the shortcomings of big companies particularly in the
 U.S..
 
 The direct consequence for insurers (including) marine is the absolute necessity to get
 balanced technical results, without being able to count on hypothetical financial profits.
 
 At the same time, insurers have a tendency to look for additional protection from their
 reinsurers, whilst similarly, reinsurers have a tendency to reduce their risk exposure, thus
 their cover capacity, as they are themselves having a hard time to obtain the cover they would
 like from their retrocessionaires partners.
 
 It is becoming more and more difficult for insurers to balance the need for a return on
 investment and at the same time to satisfy their shareholders, while keeping sufficiently
 strong capital reserves as demanded by their clients.
 
 In such an unfavourable context and in an increasingly uncertain climate, especially with the
 terrorist threats, insurers have come out with what could be called a 'survival guide':
 
 a more restrictive underwriting policy with as consequence
 a lack of capacity,an increase in retention,coverages which are sometimes more restrictive with
 notably the introduction of new exclusions:- Institute Extended Radioactive Contamination Exclusion Clause 01/11/02 (Cl. 356
 A),
 - Institute Chemical, Biological, Bio-Chemical, Electromagnetic Weapons and Cyber
 Attack Exclusion Clause 01/11/02 (Cl. 365).
 | 
 
 | Despite a fairly depressing year 2002, the main
 French companies involved in marine insurance have put up a good resistance in the face of
 exceptional deteriorating conditions.
 They have posted solvency ratios above European norms and the French market remains one of the
 world top markets.
 
 
 French insurance market is number 5
 within world rankings, 2nd in Europe for life insurance, and 3rd in damage insurance.
 French insurance remains 2nd in the
 placement of 'International hulls' in the world (excluding Japan which is mainly
 domestic).
 French credit insurance is number 1 in
 the world. French companies in the market have a capacity
 to adapt and have advantages linked to their size and geographical coverage. Nonetheless they
 remain cautious as to the future development in their operational performance, given the
 volatility and uncertainties in the financial markets.
 Current difficulties are causing a new change in outlook and are upsetting the classical
 approach to risk finance. The catastrophes of the last two years have forced insurers to
 reorganise themselves, to reinforce their capital reserves and improve their management skills.
 
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 | In the particularly dismal context of marine
 insurance, where many players are fighting for their survival, actors in the shipping sector
 are also being subjected to their own constraints within the market. Operating ships is
 becoming more and more costly, as much with international standards, which are raising levels
 of responsibility of owners as with the reinforced rules of security.
 Insurers, who want to be attentive and selective in their commitments, do not directly control
 either the security or the quality of shipping operations or the qualification of crews.
 
 Due to this situation, insurers are tending to impose technical constraints and supplementary
 charges to their clients by introducing loss prevention programmes.
 
 Nonetheless an intelligent and practical collaboration between insurers and owners can also
 make a considerable contribution towards market results. The role of an insurance broker in
 establishing a better communication between parties and an appreciation of the constraints and
 susceptibilities of both parties, should make for better competitiveness and an improved
 quality of services offered
 
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