Non-EU investments in European Union ports? The issue has become particularly sensitive in Europe in the middle of 2021 when the negotiations for the sale were announced a minority stake in Container Terminal Tollerot (CTT), Company operating a container terminal in the port of Hamburg and which is part of the German group HHLA, to the Chinese COSCO Shipping Ports ( of 4 June 2021). The negotiations were successful and in the end By the summer of the following year, the two parties had agreed that the Chinese company would have received 35% of the capital of CTT and that the Chinese shipowning group COSCO Shipping Holdings Co., which controls 61% of the capital of COSCO Shipping Ports, would selected the Hamburg container terminal as the preferred hub for two scheduled maritime services to the Far East, a service with the Mediterranean and a feeder service with the Sea Baltic, routes that the group operates with its own COSCO Shipping Lines and OOCL navigation ( of 21 September 2022).

However, the German federal government, in the meantime, had put the preliminary agreement under its magnifying glass and in Autumn had made the decision to ban the Chinese company the purchase of a share of CTT equal to or greater than 25% of the share capital social ( of 26 October 2022). The subsequent negotiations between COSCO and HHLA had led the Chinese company to accept the acquisition of 24.99% of the capital of CTT, which so far is still 100% of properties of HHLA ( of 9 January and 12 May 2023). After the green light from the Berlin government to the change of hands of this quota, last June was signed the final agreement to execute the transaction ( of 11 May and 19 June 2023).

Meanwhile, the European Commission had also examined the agreement between COSCO and HHLA on the basis of the control mechanism EU foreign investment and, with a non-binding opinion, According to several sources, he advised against approval by part of the German government.

If, with regard to port investments, the acquisition of a minority stake in CTT, involving an investment expected to be around 80 million euros, would add only one small sum to the 10.2 billion euros of Chinese investments in EU maritime infrastructure accumulated over the period 2004-2021, however, at EU level the risk of interest-bearing dependency Chinese could materialize if COSCO actually does of CTT its preferred hub for Northern Europe and countries Baltic. This is highlighted by a study on Chinese investments in European maritime infrastructure commissioned by the Commission for Transport and Tourism of the European Parliament which has been published these days and was made by Francesca Ghiretti, Jacob Gunter, Gregor Sebastian del Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies (MERICS), by Meryem Gökten, Olga Pindyuk and Zuzana Zavarská of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and by Plamen Tonchev of the Institute of International Economic Relations.

The study points out that "if this leads to new significant COSCO operations in the region, this would mean that COSCO, and its close relative CMG (the group public China Merchants Group, ed), have extended throughout the range of European shipping markets: Hamburg as a new hub to build market shares in the North and Baltic region as in the hinterland of Elba; Rotterdam and Antwerp to acquire market shares in the Channel region and the hinterland of Rhine; Valencia and I go to the western Mediterranean; and Piraeus for the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea and as a gateway to Europe in general'.

Referring to the likely tighter consequence Competition that would be triggered between European private companies and the COSCO group, which is state-owned, the authors of the study note that "if COSCO expanded in a significant its operations in the Baltic and Northern Europe in the next decade, this could mean costs of lower shipments for regional importers and exporters. However, this would probably be to the detriment of European freight forwarders who, as private companies, struggle to compete on prices because of their responsibility fiduciary, which COSCO does not have as a Chinese SOE. That increases the risks of addiction, not only for Germany, but for the EU as a whole as COSCO and other Chinese companies ensure a global presence in European shipping markets which facilitates further acquisition of market share and risks of dependence that could result from it'.

In the final conclusions, the authors of the study call for a holistic assessment of the opportunities and risks involved Chinese investment in European maritime infrastructure, examining the problem for the EU as a whole rather than focusing on individual Member States. The document notes that in the case of Chinese investment in the port of Piraeus, with the COSCO group, which owns 67% of the Authority's share capital Port of the Greek port, these "have contributed in a way significant to local development, employment, revenue tax, etc. However, at EU level, the authors point out, the benefits are less clear, since almost all activities made in Piraeus - explain the authors referring to the flow of container traffic passing through the Greek port - originate or are bound for other EU ports being simply transhipped through Piraeus when transported by COSCO ships. One Similar trend, on a smaller scale - the study notes - could emerge from the acquisition of COSCO in Hamburg: it could lead to increased flows to Hamburg if COSCO used it as a hub for transhipment for the Baltic-Northern European region. However, unless investments do not unlock a real and new demand for imports and exports that satisfy any new offer contributed by COSCO, the final result could be simply redirecting existing demand from others European ports in Hamburg at the expense of the former. It's unlikely that this happens on a large scale in the short term, but if Should it occur it could be positive for the city but would not create any net positive impact for the EU as a whole. Therefore, there are limits to the value that additional Investment in regional maritime infrastructure without a corresponding increase in import demand and exports. This, the authors point out, is was observed in the Chinese investment in Kumport, which is remained stagnant in terms of productivity and drew little benefit from the investment, despite being burdened with risks'.

"The risks arising from Chinese investments - according to The authors of the study - are evident beyond certain thresholds of ownership shares, particularly in terms of influence on port strategy and in terms of cyber risks if the Chinese companies can access IT systems and local networks. This - they specify - presents a risk at the local level, but could also entail wider risks for Europe, in particular as regards the armed forces of the Member States, and NATO'.

"However - continues the study - some of the most significant emerges not only from investments in infrastructure, but also from the subsequent expansions of activities by COSCO. These include risks of influence/coercion. localized, for example if COSCO threatens to move its transhipments to other Mediterranean ports if Greece undertake initiatives that might displease Beijing. Have also a potential impact at EU level, mainly through the European Council, which must vote on some issues unanimously'.

'Similarly, although it is a source of specific advantages - highlight the authors - a significant growth of COSCO's operations also generate dependency risks for Member States and for the EU since the carrier, which is State-owned, gains market share. The greater is COSCO's market share in the European market, conquest that is facilitated by the advantage of the protection of which COSCO enjoys on the internal market and its unfair chain of vertically integrated value, the greater the risk of dependency for the shipping services that underlie of the entire system of global value chains. This is not means that Chinese investment in European ports or participation in European maritime markets represents risks not They can be mitigated and must therefore be expelled from the common market. Per Conversely, many of the risks can be mitigated with better Monitoring and regulation and through better coordination between the EU and the Member States. However - they emphasize the authors - the current regimes to manage these risks at EU level and national are insufficient for current challenges and must be reformed'.

The study examined 24 Chinese acquisitions and 13 projects of Chinese investment in European maritime infrastructure in the period from 2004 to 2021, with acquisitions that - according to the authors - totalled a value of more than 9,1 billion euro to which add around €1.1 million of planned investments. The Document specifies that in the period 2020-2021 the activities of Chinese investment in the European maritime sector has been significantly reduced, probably as a result of the Covid-19 as well as for the introduction of more stringent Screening mechanisms for foreign investment in the region European.